A Geometric Approach to Inference in Set-Identified Entry Games by Bontemps, Christian & Kumar, Rohit
A Geometric Approach to Inference in Set-Identified Entry
Games
Christian Bontemps∗ Rohit Kumar†
December 2019
Abstract
In this paper, we consider inference procedures for entry games with complete information.
Due to the presence of multiple equilibria, we know that such a model may be set-identified
without imposing further restrictions. We complete the model with the unknown selection
mechanism and characterize geometrically the set of predicted choice probabilities, in our case,
a convex polytope with many facets. Testing whether a parameter belongs to the identified set
is equivalent to testing whether the true choice probability vector belongs to this convex set.
Using tools from the convex analysis, we calculate the support function and the extreme points.
The calculation yields a finite number of inequalities, when the explanatory variables are
discrete, and we characterized them once for all. We also propose a procedure that selects the
moment inequalities without having to evaluate all of them. This procedure is computationally
feasible for any number of players and is based on the geometry of the set. Furthermore, we
exploit the specific structure of the test statistic used to test whether a point belongs to a convex
set to propose the calculation of critical values that are computed once and independent of the
value of the parameter tested, which drastically improves the calculation time. Simulations in
a separate section suggest that our procedure performs well compared with existing methods.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides an estimation procedure for empirical models of entry and market structure,
also called entry games, which may be set-identified. Entry games are very popular in the empirical
Industrial Organization literature because they allow researchers to study the nature of firms’ profits
and the nature of competition between firms from data that are generally easy to collect. They
were popularized by the seminal works of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a), Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991b) and Berry (1992).1 However, the econometric analysis of entry games is complicated by
the presence of multiple equilibria, a problem that affects the standard estimation strategy. Without
additional assumptions, the model is indeed incomplete. Various solutions have been proposed in
the literature. First, assumptions can be added regarding the (unknown) selection mechanism in
regions of multiple equilibria. Reiss (1996) considers a specific order of entry, and Bjorn and Vuong
(1984), randomly draw the equilibrium selection. Bajari et al. (2010) introduce a parametric
specification of the selection mechanism, and Grieco (2014) extends it to a non-parametric function
of observables and non-observables. Alternatively, it is sometimes possible to estimate an entry
game from the observation of some outcome that is independent of the true selection mechanism.
In their seminal work with heterogeneous firms, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b) report that the
model uniquely predicts the number of active firms. Berry (1992) generalizes the estimation of the
profit function from the observed number of active firms for more than two players. A tremendous
number of empirical applications have followed this path (see the survey by de Paula (2012)),
notably including Mazzeo (2002), Reiss (1996), Cleeren et al. (2010), and Sampaio (2007),
among others. However, adding assumptions could lead to a misspecified model, and working on
certain invariant outcomes may lead to a suboptimal procedure (see Tamer (2003)). The recent and
blossoming literature on partial/set-identification, following earlier work by Manski (1995), makes
it possible to estimate a model that does not uniquely predict actions by using bounds. Following
Tamer (2003), the presence of multiple equilibria does not imply partial identification,2 but the
literature provides inference methods that are eligible in both cases. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)
1See Berry and Reiss (2007) for a survey.
2However, identification at infinity, as in Tamer (2003), may lead to inference procedures that are non standard;
see Khan and Tamer (2010).
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were the first to use bounds to estimate an entry game with complete information.
In this paper, we complete the model with the selection mechanism, η(·), and characterize the
set of predicted choice probabilities generated by the variation of η(·) in the space of admissible
selection mechanisms. Our first contribution is to characterize more deeply the geometric structure
of this set. The set is a convex polytope with many facets (because we focus on pure strategy Nash
equilibria), and the number of facets increases exponentially with the number of players. Alternative
equilibrium concepts have been proposed in the literature (as in Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008),
Beresteanu et al. (2011) or Galichon and Henry (2011)). Changing the equilibrium concept affects
some of the calculations provided in this paper and, sometimes, increases the complexity but does
not alter the general philosophy. Moreover, Nash equilibrium is the most commonly used solution
concept. In this paper, we derive a closed-form expression for the support function of this polytope,
the extreme points (or vertices) of which can also be calculated as a function of the primitives of the
model. These vertices are indeed characterized by an order of outcome selection in the regions of
multiple equilibria. Each vertex is also geometrically defined by the intersection of some supporting
hyperplanes. We are able to define the cone of outer normal vectors of these hyperplanes and,
thereby, the inequalities that are binding in this point.
Testing whether a parameter belongs to the identified set is equivalent to testing whether the
true choice probability vector belongs to this convex set. Following Rockafellar (1970), the sup-
port function defines a continuum of inequalities that have to be satisfied for any point in the set.
This characterization has already been used in the set-identification literature by, in particular,
Beresteanu and Molinari (2008), Beresteanu et al. (2011) and Bontemps et al. (2012). Geometri-
cally, the support function in a given direction leads to an inequality that detects whether the point
of interest belongs to the same halfspace than the convex set itself. This continuum of inequalities
simplifies here toward a finite number because of the specific structure of the entry game considered
in this paper.
However, when the number of players increases, the number of facets of the polytope increases
exponentially, and, therefore, the smallest number of inequalities necessary to have a sharp char-
acterization - from 16 in a game with three players to more than one million in a game with six
players. The standard approach for moment inequality models is to first evaluate all the moments,
3
then eliminate the ones that are far from being binding (see Andrews and Soares, 2010, for the
unconditional case). Our second contribution is to provide a geometric selection procedure that
does not require us to evaluate all the moments and for which the computational cost is polynomial
in the dimension of the outcome space (2N). The idea is to recursively identify the extreme point
of the set that is the most relevant for demonstrating that our point, the true choice probability
vector, belongs to the polytope. We then test only the inequalities related to the facets of this
extreme point and do not evaluate the other inequalities. The number of relevant moments grows
at the rate 2N as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), but with a sharper characterization of the set.
This is a considerable improvement in terms of computational burden with respect to alternative
sharp characterization methods (such as the two step approaches of Andrews and Soares (2010)
and Romano et al. (2014)).
Furthermore, and more importantly, we develop a test procedure for the hypothesis of whether
the true choice probability vector belongs to this polytope that exploits the specific structure of the
test statistic. When we test whether a parameter θ belongs to the identified set, the feasible test
statistic depends on the support function of the polytope, which is fixed, and the choice probability
vector, which is estimated. The asymptotic distribution depends on θ in a specific manner. It allows
us to derive critical values for our test procedures that are calculated once and valid for any θ. This
is a tremendous simplification with respect to a general moment inequality model. Some of the
recommended test procedures can be conservative, but, one, which exploits the maximum number
of facets at any extreme point, is not. This maximum number can be determined by brute force
using the geometric structure of the set; we also provide an upper bound. Simulations highlight that
our method works well with the sample sizes that are usually considered in the empirical literature
(from 500 to 2000 observations) and outperforms existing inference procedures.
This paper belongs to the growing literature on set-identification and lies at the intersection
between the moment inequality literature and the literature on set-identification that exploits the
geometric structure. A model is generally set-identified when the data are incomplete because of
some missing information (a censorship mechanism, two-sample combination, or multiple equilibria).
In entry games, the unknown selection mechanism in regions of multiple equilibria is the missing
one, but it is naturally bounded between 0 and 1. These bounds lead to moment inequalities (see,
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for example, Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). Moment inequality procedures are now well developed in
the partial identification literature, which includes contributions by, among others, Chernozhukov
et al. (2007), Rosen (2008), Andrews and Soares (2010), Bugni (2010), Canay (2010), Romano
and Shaikh (2008, 2010, 2012), Chernozhukov et al. (2015), Andrews and Shi (2013) or Aradillas-
Lopez and Rosen (2017). However, in most cases, the structure of the missing information is not
exploited. Other contributions exploit this missing information by characterizing the identified
set directly or indirectly through a convex set, and, then, through the support function. The
support function provides a collection of moment inequalities, but these moment inequalities have
a particular structure and are exploited differently than in the general moment inequality literature
(see, in particular, the two surveys by Molchanov and Molinari (2015) and Bontemps and Magnac
(2017)).
Papers that have exploited the structure of the missing information either use random set theory
(introduced in econometrics by Beresteanu and Molinari, 2008), optimal transport (Galichon and
Henry (2011)) or complete the model, as in Bontemps et al. (2012). Fundamentally, all methods are
intended to provide a sharp characterization of the identified set and lead to a collection of moment
inequalities that are specifically determined using the tools of the approach considered. They all
lead to the same set of inequalities. In this spirit, they can be seen as equivalent. Redundant
ones are eliminated through the characterization of what Galichon and Henry (2011) call the core
determining class. In our case, we also characterize the core determining class, i.e. the collection
of facets of the convex set, by a necessary and sufficient condition. However, in addition to these
equivalences, our geometric approach is able to select the subsets of moments that are close to
binding without having to evaluate all of them and to determine the maximum number of moments
that are binding.
Section 2 considers the general entry game with N players and no explanatory variable. Ex-
planatory variables do not play a specific role in the procedure. We characterize the regions with
multiple equilibria and compute the support function of the polytope, i.e., the set of predicted
choice probability vectors for a given parameter value. The sequence of inequalities that need to
be verified is characterized. The aim of Section 3 is to more deeply exploit the geometry of the
polytope to propose a more efficient estimation procedure. We first provide a necessary and suffi-
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cient condition for eliminating any redundant inequalities. We then propose our geometric selection
procedure which consists of determining the local extreme point of the polytope and only testing
the inequalities relative to the facets at this extreme point. Section 4 calculates the asymptotic
distribution of the test statistic used and proposes different calculations of the critical value that
are computed once for all. Section 5 proposes a few Monte Carlo simulations to assess the perfor-
mance of our inference procedure and compare it with existing procedures. Section 6 considers the
case with discrete explanatory variables, and Section 7 concludes the paper. The Supplementary
Material contains the proofs and the algorithms, the specific details for the three player game and
an additional Monte Carlo analysis.
2 Entry game with N players
We formalize the entry game with N players/firms. For exposition purposes, we first consider a
model without explanatory variables and then extend it in section 6. We first define some notations
before characterizing the identified set.
2.1 Setup and notations
2.1.1 The model
Let N denote the total number of firms that can enter any market. Following Berry (1992),
we introduce a model of market structure where the profit function piim of firm i in a market m is
assumed to be independent of the identity of the firm’s competitors. All firms decide simultaneously
whether to enter the market (the action is aim = 1) if, in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, their
profit is positive (piim > 0). Otherwise, piim <= 0, and the action is aim = 0. The profit function is
assumed, without loss of generality, to be linear in the explanatory variables3
piim = βi + αi
(∑
j 6=i
ajm
)
+ εim,
aim = 1{piim > 0}.
(1)
3Any (separable) parametric form piim = fi
(∑
j 6=i ajm;α
)
+ εim can be considered as long as the function fi(·; θ)
is strictly decreasing in its first argument.
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Following the literature on entry games, we assume that αi < 0, i.e., the presence of more com-
petitors decreases a firm’s profit.4 The unobserved components εim, i = 1, . . . , N are drawn from
a known distribution (up to some parameter vector γ). The econometrician does not observe their
values, whereas all firms within a market observe them before deciding whether to enter (complete
information case).
For identification, we first need a scale normalization, and thus, we assume that the variance
of each shock εim is equal to unity. We denote by F (·; γ) the cumulative distribution function
of εm = (ε1m, . . . , εNm)
>, and we assume that the distribution is continuous with full support.
Henceforth, we use the notation θ for all the parameters in the model (θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rl), 5 and we omit
the subscript m for notational convenience.
2.1.2 The multiplicity of pure strategy Nash equilibria
For a given market, an outcome y is the vector of actions (in {0, 1}N) taken by the firms. There
are obviously 2N possible outcomes from (0, . . . , 0)> to (1, . . . , 1)>. We denote by Y this set of
possible outcomes. YK denotes the subset of outcomes with K active firms in equilibrium, i.e. any
K firms playing action 1. There is 1 outcome with 0 active firms, N outcomes with 1 active firm
and dK =
(
N
K
)
outcomes with K active firms for K ≤ N . For each K, we label the outcomes as
y
(K)
j , j = 1, . . . , dK according to a predefined order.
6 Globally, we order the outcomes in Y first by
their number of active firms, then according to the predefined order within each YK :
Y =
 y(0)1︸︷︷︸Y0 , y
(1)
1 , . . . , y
(1)
d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y1
, . . . , y
(K)
1 , . . . , y
(K)
dK︸ ︷︷ ︸
YK
, . . . , y
(N)
1︸︷︷︸
YN
 .
It is well known that the model has multiple equilibria, i.e., there are regions of realizations of ε in
which we cannot uniquely predict each firm’s action. Consequently, there is no one-to-one mapping
between the collection of possible outcomes and the regions of ε given any parameter value θ.
What is missing from the model is the selection of a given equilibrium in the regions of multiple
equilibria. We define this selection mechanism η(·) as in Definition 2 of Galichon and Henry (2011).
4The case in which αi > 0 could be handled equivalently. Gualdani (2019) considers, in a network formation
game, these two cases.
5θ = (β1, . . . , βN , α1, . . . , αN , γ)
>
6The order for K = 1 is ((1, 0, . . . , 0)>, (0, 1, 0 . . . , 0)> ... (0, . . . , 0, 1)>), and so forth.
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Definition 1 (Equilibrium selection mechanism) An equilibrium selection mechanism is a con-
ditional probability η(·|ε; θ) of y given ε such that the selected value of the outcome variable is actually
an equilibrium predicted by the game.
We denote by E the set of selection mechanisms and by P (θ, η) the predicted choice probability
vector when the parameter of the model is θ and the selection mechanism is η(·). We partition this
vector according to the partition of Y as7
P (θ, η) =
P (0)1 (θ, η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (0)(θ,η)
, . . . , P
(K)
1 (θ, η), . . . , P
(K)
dK
(θ, η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (K)(θ,η)
, . . . , P
(N)
1 (θ, η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (N)(θ,η)

>
. (2)
One solution to the multiple equilibria problem consists of making assumption on this selection
mechanism like in Reiss (1996) or Cleeren et al. (2010), for example. The vector of predicted choice
probabilities is a point in [0, 1]2
N
and standard inference techniques can be used. This is, of course,
ad hoc and may lead to misspecification.
Another solution, ours, following the literature on set-identification, consists of characterizing all
the possible choice probabilities predicted by the model. The vector of predicted choice probabilities,
instead of being a point, belongs to a (convex) set that we characterize. Different sets of values
(θ, η) may generate the same point P (θ, η).8 Our goal is to characterize the ones which generate
the true choice probability vector. In the next subsection, we first characterize the set of choice
probabilities predicted by the model.
2.2 From the set of choice probabilities to the identified set
In this section, we want to characterize the set of predicted choice probabilities. To do so, we need
to understand the multiplicity structure and characterize it. Then, we derive a parametrization of
the set.
7In particular, P
(K)
i (θ, η) denotes Prob(y = y
(K)
i |θ, η).
8Observe that having multiple equilibria does not automatically guarantee to have set/partial identification. In
the following, our statistical procedure, which consists of inverting a test, is valid for point or set-identified models.
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2.2.1 The regions of multiple equilibria
Our specification ensures that multiple equilibria only involve outcomes with the same number of
active firms, i.e., within YK .9 Therefore, we focus on subsets of outcomes S ⊆ YK to characterize
the multiple equilibria regions. We say that a subset S ⊆ YK is in multiplicity if the prediction
of the game is all outcomes in S and no outcome outside S for ε in a non empty set, R(K)S (θ).
R(K)S (θ) is called a multiple equilibria region. We denote by S(K) the collection of subsets S of YK
in multiplicity.10
S(K) =
{
S ⊆ YK : |S| ≥ 2 and S is in multiplicity
}
.
Note that not all subsets of cardinality greater than two are elements of S(K). For example, when
N = 4 and K = 2, S1 =
{
(1, 1, 0, 0)>, (0, 0, 1, 1)>
}
is not in multiplicity whereas the subset
S2 =
{
(1, 1, 0, 0)>, (1, 0, 1, 0)>
}
is.
We now present a necessary and sufficient condition for S to be in multiplicity. Define N0 (resp.
N1) the set of indices of firms that always play action 0 (resp. 1) across S. n0 and n1 are their
cardinalities. N0 and N1 being fixed, there are
(
N−n0−n1
K−n1
)
possible outcomes in YK corresponding
to the remaining choice of the K − n1 firms which play action 1 among the N − n0 − n1 remaining
ones. S should contain all these possibilities to be in multiple equilibria and it is formalized in the
next proposition.
Proposition 1 A set S ⊆ YK is in multiplicity if and only if |S| =
(
N−n0−n1
K−n1
)
.
Observe that, for our particular examples above, S1 is not in multiplicity because n0 = n1 =
0 and, consequently, the subset should contain
(
4
2
)
= 6 outcomes with two active firms to be
in multiplicity. S2 is in multiplicity because n0 = n1 = 1 and it collects all possible outcomes
(
(
4−1−1
2−1
)
= 2). The proof of Proposition 1 characterizes also the region R(K)S (θ) of ε.
Following Proposition 1, we count the number of multiple equilibria regions.
9See the proof of Proposition 1 in the Supplementary Appendix.
10Note that the maximum number of such subsets is equal to 2dK − dK − 1.
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Proposition 2 The cardinality of S(K), i.e., the number of multiple equilibria regions predicting K
active firms, for 1 ≤ K ≤ N − 1 is equal to
∣∣S(K)∣∣ = K−1∑
n1=0
N−K−1∑
n0=0
(
N
n1
)(
N − n1
n0
)
.
When K = 1, the number of regions of multiple equilibria is
∑N
n=2
(
N
n
)
, i.e., all possible combi-
nations of more than two outcomes. However, as illustrated in Table I, the number of regions for
various values of N and K is generally far less from all the possible combinations. It means that
the parametrization of the set of predicted choice probabilities is of a much lower dimension than
one would have expected.
[Include Table I]
2.2.2 The set of predicted choice probabilities
We also define the subset of S(K) that contains one specific outcome y
(K)
j as
S
(K)
j =
{
S ∈ S(K) : y(K)j ∈ S
}
.
Following Berry and Tamer (2007) and Galichon and Henry (2011), we can calculate the prob-
ability of observing outcome y
(K)
j . This probability depends on the parameter vector θ and on the
unknown selection mechanism η that selects equilibrium y
(K)
j in the regions of multiple equilibria
that predicts this outcome. More specifically,
P
(K)
j (θ, η) =
∫
U
(K)
j (θ)
dF (ε; γ) +
∑
S∈S(K)j
∫
R(K)S (θ)
η
(
y
(K)
j |ε; θ
)
dF (ε; γ), (3)
where U
(K)
j (θ) is the region of ε ∈ RN which uniquely predicts the outcome y(K)j . Let us denote by
∆
(K)
j (θ) =
∫
U
(K)
j (θ)
dF (ε; γ) and ∆
(K)
S (θ) =
∫
R(K)S (θ)
dF (ε; γ) for S ∈ S(K).
Let A(θ) (resp. BK(θ), for any K = 0, . . . , N) be the set of P (θ, η) (resp. P
(K)(θ, η)) generated
by the variation of η in E
A(θ) =
{
P ∈ R2N : ∃η ∈ E , P = P (θ, η)
}
, BK(θ) =
{
P (K) ∈ RdK : ∃η ∈ E , P (K) = P (K)(θ, η)} .
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Equation (3) is a parametrization of the sets A(θ) and BK(θ), K = 0, . . . , N . This parametriza-
tion is indexed by the regions R(K)S (θ), counted in Table I.
2.2.3 A characterization of the identified set
Let P0 = P (θ0, η0) be the true choice probabilities generated by the true (unknown) parameter θ0
and the true (unknown) selection mechanism η0.
11 The identified set ΘI is defined as the collection
of points θ such that P0 can be rationalized with a selection mechanism
ΘI =
{
θ ∈ Θ : such that ∃η ∈ E , P0 = P (θ, η)
}
. (4)
The following is easily verified:
θ ∈ ΘI if and only if P0 ∈ A(θ). (5)
We therefore need to be more precise about the structure of A(θ) to be able to verify the second
part. The following result holds:
Proposition 3 A(θ) is a convex set of R2N , and
A(θ) = B0(θ)×B1(θ)×B2(θ)× . . .×BN(θ),
where BK(θ) is a convex set in RdK .
The convexity of A(θ) is a general feature of an entry game and does not depend on our spec-
ification (see Beresteanu et al. (2011)). Its specific structure, i.e., the direct product of several
components, comes from our specification in Equation (1) which ensures the unicity of the number
of active firms in the regions of multiple equilibria. This structure simplifies some of the following
results of this section.
Also, BK(θ) is a point only when the number of active firms in equilibrium is 0 or N, because
there is no region of multiple equilibria involving these specific outcomes. Note that each BK(θ) is
strictly included12 in the cube, CubK , defined by
∆
(K)
j (θ) ≤ P (K)j ≤ ∆(K)j (θ) +
∑
S∈S(K)j
∆
(K)
S (θ), ∀j = 1, . . . , dK (6)
11We define P
(K)
0 = P
(K)(θ0, η0), K = 0, . . . , N like in Equation (2).
12A visual illustration of the case with three players and K = 1 is provided in the Supplementary Appendix.
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It comes from the fact that η(·) in Equation (3) lies between 0 and 1.
ΘI , the identified set, is not convex, but it can be characterized by verifying that a point, P0,
belongs to a convex set, A(θ). Using Proposition 3, we can decompose this condition into the
following sub-conditions:
P0 ∈ A(θ) iff ∀K ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , N
}
, P
(K)
0 ∈ BK(θ).
2.3 The support function and a first selection of moment inequalities
Following the convex literature, we introduce the support function of each convex set BK(θ). This
tool has, in particular, been used, in the set-identified literature, by Beresteanu and Molinari (2008)
and Bontemps et al. (2012). It helps in generating the set of inequalities satisfied by P0. We first
recall what the support function of a convex set is and how it generates the inequalities that are
the basis of our inference procedure. The support function of a convex set A ⊂ Rd is defined as:
δ∗(q;A) = sup
x∈A
q>x.
for all directions, q ∈ Rd. Its geometrical interpretation is illustrated in Figure 1. The support
function of a convex set in a given direction locates the supporting hyperplane in this direction. For
each direction q, it defines an inequality that is satisfied by any point of the convex set. The support
function implicitly gathers all the inequalities that define the convex set into a single function. If
the set is smooth, there is a continuum of such inequalities; if it is a polytope, only a finite number
of inequalities is necessary to characterize the set. Kaido and Santos (2014) show that, when the
set is convex, using the support function leads to an efficient estimator of the convex identified set.
Following Rockafellar (1970) and Proposition 3, the identified set is characterized by the fol-
lowing inequalities
θ ∈ ΘI ⇐⇒ P0 ∈ A(θ)
⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ R2N , q>P0 ≤ δ∗(q;A(θ)),
⇐⇒ ∀K, P (K)0 ∈ BK(θ),
⇐⇒ ∀K, ∀qK ∈ RdK , q>KP (K)0 ≤ δ∗(qK ;BK(θ)).
(7)
We now turn to the calculation of the support function of BK(θ) for any K. Let qK ∈ RdK be
a given direction. We assume the following order among the coordinates of qK : qi1,K ≥ qi2,K ≥
12
. . . ≥ qidK ,K . We also partition S(K), the collection of subsets of outcomes with K active firms in
multiplicity, as follows: we denote O(K)i1 = S(K)i1 , the elements of S(K) which contain the outcome
y
(K)
i1
and by O(K)i2 the subset of elements of S(K)i2 that are not in O(K)i1 , i.e., S(K)i2 \S(K)i1 and more
generally O(K)ij = S
(K)
ij
\ ∪k<j S(K)ik , for any j ≤ dK . Note that the construction of the outcomes
O(K)j ’s is linked to the order of the components of qK . We now provide a closed-form expression for
the support function in this direction.
Proposition 4 Let qK ∈ RdK , and assume qi1,K ≥ qi2,K ≥ . . . ≥ qidK ,K. The support function in
the direction qK, δ
∗ (qK ;BK(θ)), is equal to:
δ∗ (qK ;BK(θ)) =
dK∑
j=1
qj,K∆
(K)
j (θ) +
dK∑
j=1
qij ,K
 ∑
S∈O(K)ij
∆
(K)
S (θ)
 . (8)
It is reached at the extreme point
E
(K)
i1,i2,...,idK
= vec
(
∆
(K)
1 (θ) +
∑
S∈O(K)1
∆
(K)
S (θ), . . . ,∆
(K)
dK
(θ) +
∑
S∈O(K)dK
∆
(K)
S (θ)
)
.
Consequently, BK(θ) is a polytope, and its vertices are included in the set of points E
(K)
i1,i2,...,idK
where the vector of indices (i1, . . . , idK ) is any permutation of the vector of indices (1, 2, . . . , dK) .
BK(θ) has at most dK ! vertices.
Each extreme point of BK(θ), and therefore its support function, can be calculated from the knowl-
edge of the non-zero values of ∆
(K)
S (θ), S ∈ S(K). This number of non-zero values is the number
of multiple equilibria regions and we saw in Proposition 2 that this number is much smaller than
2dK − dK − 1 (see table I). Consequently, the parametrization of BK(θ) is numerically tractable
for moderate values of N . Furthermore, each non-zero value ∆
(K)
S (θ) can easily be calculated or
simulated from the knowledge of the distribution of ε.
We can now extend this result to the calculation of the support function of the full set A(θ) for
any direction q ∈ R2N . We adopt the standard notation: q = vec(q0, q1, . . . , qN), where qK is the
direction related to the set BK(θ) (i.e., qK ∈ RdK ) and vec(·) denotes the vertical concatenation.
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Proposition 5 The support function of A(θ) in direction q is equal to
δ∗ (q;A(θ)) =
N∑
K=0
δ∗ (qK ;BK(θ)) . (9)
This results come from the specific characterization of A(θ) in Proposition 3. The last proposi-
tion, combined with Equation (7), is the basis of our inference procedure. It generates a continuum
of inequalities that have to be satisfied for any parameter of the identified set. However, since all
the BK(θ)’s and, therefore, A(θ), are polytopes, it is necessary and sufficient to test the inequalities
in a finite set of directions. We now explicit this set of directions, first for the BK(θ)’s than for
A(θ).
Let QK be the set of non-null directions of RdK with coordinates that are either one or zero.
There are 2dK − 1 directions in QK . The next proposition shows that it is sufficient to check the
inequalities in QK , for all K, to characterize the identified set.
Proposition 6
θ ∈ ΘI ⇐⇒ ∀K ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, ∀qK ∈ QK , q>KP (K)0 ≤ δ∗(qK ;BK(θ)).
Remark We already mentioned that our specification ensures that the number of firms entering
the market is constant among outcomes in multiplicity. As a result, the sets BK(θ) belong to an
hyperplane because the sum of the components of P (K)(θ, η) is a constant which depends on θ only.
If we wanted to characterize one BK(θ) only, for one specific choice of K, we would need to consider
all the directions of QK combined with the direction (−1,−1, . . . ,−1) to ensure the equality of the
sum of all components. Here, due to the fact that we are considering A(θ), which is included in the
simplex (the sum of all the probabilities is equal to 1),13 we don’t need to consider this direction.
As a matter of fact, if all the inequalities are satisfied with (1, . . . , 1) for all K, they are equalities
and therefore are automatically satisfied for (−1,−1, . . . ,−1).
Optimal transport, random sets or completion of the model Our approach consists in
characterizing the set A(θ) (or, equivalently, the sets BK(θ)) through its support function and
13We thank one of the referees for highlighting this issue.
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extreme points. This is done after having completed the model with the unknown selection mech-
anism, η(·), and finding which selection mechanisms generate the extreme points. The geometric
structure induced by the multiplicities allows us to exhibit the inequalities that are satisfied by any
parameter of the identified set.
Galichon and Henry (2011) use the optimal transport theory and the notion of core determining
class to generate the relevant inequalities that characterize sharply the identified set. Beresteanu et
al. (2011) emphasize that an entry game is a model with convex predictions. They use random set
theory and, in particular, the Aumann expectation considered in their paper is our set A(θ). Both
methods are numerically challenging for a game with 6 players even when considering only pure
strategy equilibria. Following Proposition 6, there are, at maximum,
∑N
K=0(2
dK − 1) inequalities.
However, this number is very large when N ≥ 6 ; we have more than 1 million of inequalities to
check for 6 players.
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) bound the sets BK(θ) by the cubes CubK introduced above, which
are easier to characterize. Their approach can handle games with a moderate number of players
above 6, like our method, but bounding component by component makes the estimated set larger,
and sharpness is not attained.
Fundamentally, whether one uses random set theory and the capacity functional, the optimal
transport approach of Galichon and Henry (2011) or the approach presented in this paper, all these
methods are intended to derive a sufficient set of inequalities satisfied by the parameters in a specific
manner. Each method has its specificities. However, our approach allows us to go deeper into the
geometric analysis of the set A(θ) and this is the objective of the next section.
3 Using the geometry of A(θ) to select inequalities
The convex set BK(θ) can be characterized by at most 2
dK − 1 inequalities. Due to its particular
geometry, it may be the case that some of these inequalities are redundant. In this section, we
present two strategies to reduce the number of inequalities. The first consists of calculating a core
determining class introduced by Galichon and Henry (2011) and later used in Chesher and Rosen
(2017). The second consists of exploiting further the geometry to propose a geometric selection
procedure of the inequalities without having to evaluate all of them.
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3.1 Deriving a core determining class of an entry game
The core determining class introduced by Galichon and Henry (2011) yields to a collection of non-
redundant moment inequalities that are sufficient to sharply characterize the identified set ΘI .
We provide a characterization of the core determining class in an entry game from the geometric
study of the multiplicity structure of the model. For the text to be self-contained, we borrow some
definitions and concepts from Galichon and Henry (2011).
Definition 2 (Choquet capacity) A Choquet capacity L on the set Y is a set function L : C ⊆
Y → [0, 1] that is
• normalized, i.e., L(∅) = 0 and L(Y) = 1, and
• monotone, i.e., L(C) ≤ L(B), for any C ⊆ B ⊆ Y.
Definition 3 The smallest class Ω of subsets of Y is called core determining for the Choquet ca-
pacity L on Y if P(C) ≤ L(C) holds for all C ∈ Ω; then, P(C) ≤ L(C) holds for all C ⊆ Y.
The set A(θ) is characterized by its support function. Thus, we define the Choquet capacity for a
subset CK ⊆ YK as
L(CK) = δ∗
(
eCK ;BK(θ)
)
= max
η∈E
 ∑
j|y(K)j ∈CK
Pj(θ, η)
 , (10)
where eCK ∈ {0, 1}dK with
(
eCK
)
j
= 1 if y
(K)
j ∈ CK and 0 otherwise. For a collection of subsets
C =
{
CK ⊆ YK : K ≤ N
}
, the Choquet capacity is defined as L(C) = ∑Nk=0 L(CK). L is
monotone, as it is the sum of quantities that are positive and L(Y) = 1.
We define the concept of connectedness, which is useful for the exposition, introduced by Gali-
chon and Henry (2011). For a subset CK ⊆ YK , we define the (undirected) graph generated by CK
as ΓCK = (CK , E),
14 where there is an edge between two vertices if they are in multiplicity with
eventually some additional outcomes that are only in CK (no outcome from YK \ CK). For any
graph Γ = (V,E), we say that C ⊆ V is connected in the graph Γ if there is a path of elements
of E connecting any pair of nodes of C.
14Recall that an undirected graph Γ = (V,E) is a collection of vertices/nodes V and edges/links E that link these
vertices. A graph Γ is connected if any pair of vertices are connected in Γ.
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Definition 4 (Well connectedness) A subset CK ⊆ YK is called well connected in YK if YK \CK
is connected in the graph ΓYK\CK .
Note that YK is in multiplicity. Therefore, the graph ΓYK is connected, and every CK ⊆ YK is
connected in the graph ΓYK . The notion of well connectedness extends the notion of connectedness
by imposing restrictions on the complementary of CK .
Note that the graph ΓY is not connected, as there is no multiplicity between YK and YK′ , for
K 6= K ′. Thus, ΓYK is a component of ΓY .15 We collect all well-connected subsets of YK as
ΩK =
{
CK ⊆ YK : CK well connected in YK
}
Galichon and Henry (2011) present some models in which the core determining class can be of
much lower cardinality than 2|Y| by exploiting the monotonicity property in certain supermodular
games. However, their approach does not provide a way to find a core determining class for a
general entry game. Chesher and Rosen (2017) provide a sufficient condition to characterize a
core determining class of set-identified models that can be written into what they call a generalized
instrument variable model. Our next proposition provides a complete characterization of a core
determining class for our entry model through a necessary and sufficient condition.
Proposition 7 A collection Ω of subsets of Y is core determining for L in (10) if and only if
Ω =
{
ΩK : K = 0, 1, . . . , N
}
.
Subsection A.7 in the Supplementary Appendix provides an algorithm to construct the core deter-
mining class from Proposition 7. It is applied for the particular examples of N = 4 and K = 2 in
Subsection A.7.2. However, it does not significantly reduce the number of non-redundant moment
inequalities in our entry game. For example, when N = 6 and K = 3, it eliminates fewer than
30, 000 inequalities from a total of 220 − 1 = 1, 048, 575.
3.2 A geometric selection procedure
The core determining class is a useful concept because we eliminate redundant inequalities. However,
it does not significantly reduce the number of inequalities in our entry game. We now present a
15Recall that for an undirected graph Γ = (V,E), components of Γ are subgraphs {Hi}ki=1 such that each Hi is
connected and Hi is not connected to Hj for i 6= j.
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geometric selection procedure that fully exploits the geometry of the sets BK(θ). The procedure
first selects the extreme point of the set that seems the closest to the vector P
(K)
0 and then evaluates
only the inequalities associated with this extreme point, i.e., tests the directions that are the outer
normal vector of the supporting hyperplanes of BK(θ) at this point, and this, for each K = 0, . . . , N .
Following Proposition 4, an extreme point is determined by an order in the coordinates (note that,
a priori, two different orders could lead to the same physical point). The first part of the algorithm
is intended to determine this order in a recursive manner by exploiting the position of P
(K)
0 with
respect to the cube CubK which contains BK(θ). We explain the steps in non-technical detail below
and formalize the algorithm in Section A.8 of the Supplementary Appendix.
Local moment selection Our local moment selection procedure can be summarized as follows:
1. Determine the cube CubK that contains BK(θ) by calculating the minimum and maximum
of each coordinate. Then, determine which coordinate of P
(K)
0 is the furthest from the center
of the cube.
2. Assume this is the jth coordinate.
(a) If it is on the maximum side, the extreme point is of type E
(K)
j,?,...,?(θ), and we now have
to determine the next component. To do so, we project P
(K)
0 on the face, and we repeat
the previous calculation by taking into account that we are on the face that maximizes
the jth coordinate.
(b) If it is on the minimum side, we know that our extreme point will be of the form
E
(K)
?,...,?,j(θ), and we now have to determine the next component. To do so, we project
P
(K)
0 on this face, and we repeat the previous calculation by taking into account that we
are on the face that minimizes the jth coordinate.
3. Repeat the following steps until having found one order of coordinates.
4. Once the local extreme point E
(K)
i1,i2,...,idK
is determined, we can focus on the directions of the
local supporting hyperplanes. Let the dK directions, ei1 , ei1,i2 ,..., ei1,i2,...,id1−1 , ei1,i2,...,id1 , where
the components are equal to 1 when the indices are subscripts of e and 0 otherwise. This
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set of directions is included in the set of directions of the local supporting hyperplanes. Only
checking these directions doesn’t provide a sharp characterization of BK(θ) unless K = 1 or
N − 1 but, however, provides an important refinement with respect to the existing method
of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). An algorithm is provided in the Supplementary Appendix to
derive the other directions to consider.16
Our procedure selects which moments among the 2dK −1 are potentially binding without having
to evaluate all of them. The selection is based on the spatial location of the point P (K) and exploits
the geometry of the set BK(θ). Proposition 8 shows that the procedure is sharp for N = 3.
Proposition 8 Our local moment selection procedure provides a sharp characterization of the iden-
tified set for N = 3.
However, it is difficult to prove sharpness with any number of players N due to the difficulty
of globally characterizing all the facets. We evaluate this procedure for N = 4 in the Monte Carlo
section and results highlight that we are sharp too.
4 Estimation and inference
Following the results derived above, we now adopt the approach developed in Beresteanu and
Molinari (2008) and Bontemps et al. (2012) for testing a point in a convex set:
θ ∈ ΘI(P)⇐⇒ P0 ∈ A(θ)
⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ G, T∞(q; θ) = δ∗(q;A(θ))− q>P0 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ min
q∈G
T∞(q; θ) ≥ 0.
P0 is the true choice probability. The set of directions G is defined as
G =
N⋃
K=0
{
vec
(
0∑K−1
i=0 di
, qK , 0∑N
i=K+1 di
)
: qK ∈ GK
}
,
16Intuitively, there are more facets at these extreme points because, due to the lower number of subsets in multi-
plicity, different orders of the indices i1, . . . , idK lead to the same point E
(K)
i1,...,idK
(θ).
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where, either GK = QK as defined in Proposition 6 or GK = ΩK the core determining class
characterized in Proposition 7.17 The set G collects successively all the directions needed to sharply
characterize the identified set.
The test based on T∞(·) is infeasible because we do not observe P0. We now characterize the
feasible test statistic and its asymptotic distribution under the null and derive strategies to calculate
the critical values. Throughout this section, we assume that we observe a sample of M i.i.d. markets
in which the same N firms (known to the econometrician) compete.
4.1 The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic
Let TM(q; θ) be the empirical counterpart of T∞(q; θ):
TM(q; θ) = δ
∗(q;A(θ))− q>PˆM ,
where PˆM =
1
M
M∑
m=1
[1(Ym = y1), . . . ,1(Ym = y2N )]
> is the empirical frequency vector. Under the
assumption that the markets are i.i.d., we have:
√
M
(
PˆM − P0
)
d−→
M→∞
N (0,Σ0),
where Σ0 = diag(P0)−P0(P0)>. Note that the only random part in TM(·) comes from the estimation
of the choice probabilities. Consequently, for q and θ fixed, TM(q; θ) is asymptotically normal with
variance q>Σ0q. An empirical estimator, Σˆ, can be used by plugging in PˆM in place of P0 in the
expression of Σ0.
In this section, we want our asymptotic result to be valid not only for the true probability
but also uniformly in the neighborhood of the true probability. We impose the following uniform
integrability condition:
Assumption 1 (Uniform integrability) The class P satisfies
lim
λ→∞
sup
P∈P
sup
j∈{1,...,2N}
EP
( 1(Y = yj)− µj(P )√
µj(P )(1− µj(P ))
)2
1
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1(yj)− µj(P )√µj(P )(1− µj(P ))
∣∣∣∣∣ > λ
} = 0, (UI)
17Observe that, if, for any K, q˜K = vec
(
0∑K−1
i=0 di
, qK , 0∑N
i=K+1 di
)
,
δ(q˜K ;A(θ)) = δ(qK ;BK(θ)).
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where µj(P ) = EP (Y = yj).
Assumption UI ensures the uniform convergence of our test statistic over the class of probability
distributions P . This condition is satisfied over the class of probability distributions such that
µj(P ) ≥ ε for each j and some ε > 0.
The literature on inference in partially identified models has largely focused on the construction
of confidence regions CM . There is an open debate about whether one should cover any point of
the identified set (and, in particular, the true value) or the identified set entirely. Unless stated
otherwise, we are mainly interested in covering any point in the identified set with some pre-specified
probability 1− α, i.e.,
lim inf
M→∞
inf
P∈P
inf
θ∈ΘI(P )
P (θ ∈ CM) ≥ 1− α.
Following Bontemps et al. (2012), our inference method is based on TM(q; θ), rescaled by
√
M and
normalized (see Chernozhukov et al., 2015):
ξM(θ) =
√
M min
q∈G
TM(q; θ)√
q>Σˆq
.
A point θ belongs to the confidence region C if the test based on ξM(θ) is not rejected. We now
calculate the asymptotic distribution of the test statistics ξM(θ).
Proposition 9 Let Qθ be the set of minimizers of T∞(q; θ) in G. Let Z be a random vector of R2N
distributed according to the normal distribution with variance Σ0. We have ξM(θ)
d−→
M→∞
minq∈Qθ
q>Z√
q>Σq
if P0 ∈ A(θ),
ξM(θ)
a.s−→
M→∞
−∞ if P0 /∈ A(θ),
Under assumption UI, these results are uniformly valid over P ∈ P.
Observe that the asymptotic distribution depends on θ only through Qθ. It is an important remark
that we exploit in the next subsections to provide new critical values.
4.2 A global bound approach
We first propose conservative bounds. They have the advantage of being calculated simply and once
for all for any θ, thereby considerably simplifying the inference procedure. They can be used in a
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first step to locate the confidence region. This approach is based on the idea that we can trivially
define two outer sets of Qθ and, using these, bound the asymptotic distribution of ξM(θ). We thus
have:
Qθ ⊂ G ⊂ R,
where R is the set of all non null directions of R2N . Consequently,
min
q∈Qθ
q>Z√
q>Σq
≥ min
q∈G
q>Z√
q>Σq
≥ min
q∈R
q>Z√
q>Σq
.
We denote respectively by c(G, α) and c(R, α), the α quantile of the bounding distributions. First,
observe that
min
q∈R
q>Z√
q>Σq
= −min ‖Z∗‖ ,
where Z∗ is distributed as a standard multivariate normal variable of dimension 2N . Second, we
provide an algorithm in Section A.15 of the Supplementary Appendix to simulate the critical value
c(G, α) with a number of calculations polynomial in N . The confidence region is defined as the
collection of points for which the test statistic ξM(θ) is above a given threshold:
C(c) = {θ ∈ Θ : ξM(θ) ≥ c} (11)
Using the result of Proposition 9, we can show that the confidence regions built using our procedures
have, asymptotically and uniformly over P , the correct coverage rate for any point of the identified
set.
Proposition 10 Under Assumption UI, the following holds:
lim inf
M→∞
inf
P∈P
inf
θ∈ΘI
P (θ ∈ C(c(R, α))) ≥ lim inf
M→∞
inf
P∈P
inf
θ∈ΘI
P (θ ∈ C(c(G, α))) ≥ 1− α.
Observe that because we bound the asymptotic distribution of both ξM(θ) uniformly for θ ∈ ΘI ,
the confidence regions built from our global bounding strategy entirely cover the identified set. We
therefore have the following stronger result:
Corollary 11 Under Assumption UI,
lim inf
M→∞
inf
P∈P
P (ΘI ⊂ C(c(R, α))) ≥ lim inf
M→∞
inf
P∈P
P (ΘI ⊂ C(c(G, α))) ≥ 1− α.
22
4.3 A local bound approach
The global approach above has a tremendous computational advantage because we calculate a
critical value once. However, it is quite conservative. We now consider a new bound for the
distribution of ξM(θ) based on a moderate deviation inequality for a self normalized sum used in
Chernozhukov et al. (2014). It is based on the calculation of an upper bound on the number of
facets of each set BK(θ), which gives the highest possible number of binding moments.
4.3.1 The number of facets of BK(θ) at any extreme point
We know from Proposition 4, that BK(θ) is included in an hyperplane of RdK . It is due to the fact
that the sum of the choice probabilities of all outcomes in YK is constant. Following the convex
literature, an exposed face is the intersection between a supporting hyperplane and the convex set.
Henceforth, we call facets of BK(θ) at any extreme point all dK−1 and dK−2-faces containing this
extreme point. Each facet is related to one supporting hyperplane which defines one non-redundant
inequality.
From Proposition 4, the maximum number of extreme points of BK(θ) is dK !. We first consider
the case in which K = 1 as a benchmark (by symmetry, it also characterizes the case in which
K = N − 1) before considering the general case. Observe first that the geometry of a set BK(θ)
is the same as that of the set BN−K(θ). We characterize the geometry of the sets B1(θ) that will
serve as a benchmark for considering the other sets.
Proposition 12 The convex set B1(θ) has d1! extreme points. Each of them is the intersection of
d1 supporting hyperplanes.
See the proof in the Supplementary Appendix. Following Proposition 2, we know that any
subset of Y1 of cardinality greater than 2 corresponds to a multiple equilibria region. Consequently,
∆
(1)
S (θ) for any subset S ⊆ Y1 is non-zero, and, following Proposition 4, any change in the order
gives a different point E
(1)
i1,i2,...,id1
.
For a general value of K, many collections of outcomes cannot be a prediction of a multiple
equilibria region. Consequently, there are fewer than dK ! extreme points. Intuitively, different
orders of the components of the direction qK may lead to the same physical extreme point (i.e., for
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example, E
(K)
i1,i2,i3...,idK
= E
(K)
i1,i3,i2...,idK
). More importantly, there are more than dK facets at these
extreme points. The question is now to determine what are the facets at these specific extreme
points and how many they are.
Proposition 13 Any extreme point of BK(θ) for 1 < K < N − 1 is the intersection of at most
2lmax + (dK − lmax − 1)2lmax−1 supporting hyperplanes, where lmax is the maximum cardinality of a
subset of
{
y
(K)
1 , . . . , y
(K)
dK
}
that cannot be in multiplicity. Furthermore, an algorithm is provided in
the Supplementary Appendix to determine the facets at each extreme point E
(K)
i1,i2,i3...,idK
.
The result of Proposition 13 gives an upper bound on the number of facets at each extreme
point and, therefore, on the number of binding moments. Observe that this number is exponentially
smaller than the total number of inequalities 2dK − 1. The upper bound on the number of facets
passing through any extreme point of BK(θ) can be improved further on a case-by-case basis. Table
II gives the maximum number of facets for N = 3 to 6.
4.3.2 Using the maximum number of facets to calculate a new critical value
The maximum number of facets of A(θ) at any extreme point is the sum of the maximum number
of facets of each BK(θ) calculated above. We call it L∗.
Following Chernozhukov et al. (2014), we can use this number to provide a new critical value
which is still conservative but much better than the ones derived in the global approach. Intuitively,
the critical value calculated in the global approach assumes that all inequalities calculated from the
direction in Q are binding whereas this new one only takes one of the existing extreme points as
the worst case. The critical value is equal to
cL∗ (α) =
Φ−1 (α/L∗)√
1− Φ−1 (α/L∗)2 /M
(12)
where Φ is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, and Φ−1 its inverse. We have now the
following result:
Proposition 14 Under Assumption UI,
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈P
inf
θ∈ΘI(P )
P (θ ∈ C(cL∗(α))) ≥ 1− α.
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Observe that the last procedure is not valid for covering the entire identified set because the set
of minimizers Qθ, despite uniformly bounding its cardinal, varies with the point tested.
5 Monte Carlo simulations
We now evaluate the performance of the different testing procedures proposed in Section 4 in a
simple game with N players, with N being equal to 3 and 4. The profit function is equal to:
piim = β + αi
∑
j 6=i
ajm + εim,
where we assume that the term β is the same across firms, and this is known to the econometrician.
εim, for i = 1, . . . , N , is drawn from a standard Normal distribution. We report the results for
M = 1000 independent markets. All the results displayed are based on 1000 replications, and the
level of the tests is α = 5%.
5.1 Experiments in a game with three players
We consider a model with three symmetric players where β = 0.35 and α1 = α2 = α3 = −0.4.
However, the econometrician only knows that β is the same for all players. Consequently, the
model is set-identified. The true selection mechanism gives an order of entry to firm 1, 2, 3 in this
order in the multiple equilibria regions. Thus, we have the following probabilities for the number of
active firms in equilibrium: P (K = (0, 1, 2, 3)) = (.048, .482, .435, .035). We also assume that the
profit shocks are independent. For inference, we first compare three different approaches: ”Bound”
means that we only use the minimum and maximum of the probability of each possible outcome,
as in (6), ”Ineq” means that we test any point θ by considering the full set of directions proposed
in Proposition 6. ”Local” means that we apply our geometric selection procedure and only test the
inequalities that define this local extreme point.
Critical values We display the results for the choice of two different critical values, c(G, α) and
cL∗(α) defined in subsections 4.2 and 4.3 (labeled ”G” and ”L” in the table). For the local approach,
we also compare our results with the exact critical value which can be computed, in this case, due
to the low dimensionality of the problem.
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Before turning to the results, we would like to compare our critical values with the ones which
would have been computed while using the moment inequality literature. We consider the one of
Andrews and Soares (2010) and its refinement by Romano et al. (2014).18
First, it would lead to an increasing amount of computer time. This essentially comes from
the fact that the specific structure of the asymptotic distribution is not exploited and that the
GMS procedure of Andrews and Soares (2010) has to first evaluate all inequalities, select them and
bootstrap the test statistic for each point tested. The computation time drops from 11h to 4s on a
single processor (for approximately 2.5 million points tested) when one exploits the geometry and
computes the critical values proposed in the last section.
Second, the values are reported in Table III for two points, one on the boundary of the set
A(θ) and one in the interior of the set. For small sample, the GMS procedures do not perform
much better than the uniform approach suggested in our paper. One needs a very high sample size,
greater than 3, 000 to obtain better performances, and this is only true for the AS procedure for the
interior point. Our local approach is, of course, much more accurate for testing a point located at
the frontier, it is by construction more conservative for an interior point. Further results about the
mean rejection rate across simulations for a sequence of points containing points from the identified
set and outside this identified set are provided in the Supplementary Appendix and confirm the fact
that our procedure works well.
Simulation results Table IV displays the results of our simulations. We report the information
relative to the estimation of α1, α2, α3 and β. We test each point θ = (α1, α2, α3, β) on some
predefined grid (defined below each table) and retain those that are not rejected by the testing
procedures. The accepted points are then projected on each axis. We report the average of the
minimum and maximum values across all simulations. It would be possible to consider the recent
work of Kaido et al. (2018), who propose a procedure for subvector inference. However, here, we
are mainly interested in comparing the different strategies. We also report the average number of
points which pass the test normalized by the average number of points which pass the test in the
local approach with the exact critical value. We call it ”Vol. CR” in the Tables. This measure is a
18They are labeled respectively AS and RSW in the table.
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proxy for the relative sizes of the confidence regions.
We also propose different versions of the inequalities. There are many equivalent ways to charac-
terize the identified set by a minimal set of inequalities and equalities. The small sample properties
of the different testing strategies may be different. This is the reason why we compare the four
equivalent sets of inequalities, 19 which all sharply characterize A(θ). ”Ineq1” considers the 16
directions in Q defined in Proposition 6; in ”Ineq2”, we replace the directions (1, 1, 0) in QK for
K = 1, 2 by the direction (0, 0,−1). It is based on the observation that testing the inequalities for
(1, 0, 0)>, (1, 1, 0)> and (1, 1, 1)> is equivalent to testing the inequalities for (1, 0, 0)>, (0, 0,−1)>
and (1, 1, 1)>. ”Ineq3” considers the whole set of inequalities and equalities which define B0(θ) to
B3(θ), dropping the equality related to B2(θ), because of redundancy. There are 18 inequalities
tested. Finally, ”Ineq4” applies to Ineq3 the replacement of (0, 0,−1) by (1, 1, 0) in QK for K = 1, 2.
[Include Tables IV ]
Obviously, a more conservative critical values leads to a larger confidence region. The conser-
vative critical value c(G, α) is not bad at all, even if a local analysis provides a better accuracy.
There are some differences between the different sets of inequalities, and the bound approach seems
competitive. It is worth noting that the DGP is in favor of the bounds because the independence
between the profit shocks make the multiple regions very small.
The most efficient combination is ”Ineq4”, whatever the choice of the critical value. The geo-
metric selection procedure is conducted with the set of inequalities ”Ineq4” and the critical value
cL∗ . Unsurprisingly, it leads to the same outcome which is very close to the optimal one when one
considers the exact critical value, a case difficult to consider when the number of players is higher.
Additional example We also report the results for a slight modification of the parameters ; it
changes the accuracy of the bound approach. With β = 0.6, α2 = −0.5 and α1 = α3 = −0.7, we
have the following probabilities for the number of active firms in equilibrium: P (K = (0, 1, 2, 3)) =
(.021, .499, .464, .016). The model is also set-identified and the sizes of B1(θ0) and B2(θ0) are now
larger. The results are displayed in Table V. The ratio between the bound approach and the
19The directions considered in these four cases are defined in subsection A.16.3 in the Supplementary Appendix.
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”sharp” inequality approach is more in favor of the sharp characterization. ”Ineq4” and our local
procedure are still the two best procedures.
[Include Tables V ]
5.2 A four player example
Finally, we consider a four player example. We conduct a similar experiment than for the three
player case with two different values of αi, i = 1, ..., 4. We have β = 0.38, α1 = α4 = −0.35
and α2 = α3 = −0.2. The order of entry of the firms in the multiple equilibria regions is purely
random. Thus, we have the following probabilities for the number of active firms in equilibrium:
P (K = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4)) = (.015, .237, .530, .207, .011). We assume that the econometrician knows that
the true values of α are equal two by two. The model is therefore point-identified. The different set
of directions considered are defined similarly as well as the critical values. We also report the results
relative to our geometric selection procedure (”Local”) in which we use cL∗ as the critical value.
All the results are displayed in Table VI. First, the size of the confidence region calculated with
the bound approach is much larger than the size of the same region calculated with our procedure.
When the dimension of Y increases, the ratio between the volume of the cube which contains A(θ)
and the volume of A(θ) increases too. A component wise bound approach selects much more points
than a local approach (the volume ratio is close to 2). Like, for N = 3, the same set of inequalities
can be tested differently. Combining equalities and inequalities seem to be better (the volume ratio
with respect to the most efficient combination are respectively equal to 1.5 for ”Ineq1” and 1.3 for
”Ineq3”). And, finally, following the results developed in this paper, a brute force algorithm would
test 92 inequalities. A geometric selection procedure leads to the estimation of only 18 inequalities.
It is still possible to compare this procedure with the brute force one for this value of N . Observe
that they lead to the same size of the confidence region, highlighting the efficiency of our geometric
selection procedure.
[Include Table VI]
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6 Extensions with explanatory variables
We now generalize our approach to the case with discrete explanatory variables Z ∈ Rl, whether
Z is genuinely discrete or discretized as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). Let the support of Z be
Z = {z1, . . . , zd}. The profit function in Equation (1) becomes
piim = βi + Z
>
imγi + αi
(∑
j 6=i
ajm
)
+ εim,
aim = 1{piim > 0}.
(13)
All the discussion in the previous sections can now be generalized conditional on Zm = (Z1m, . . . , ZNm) ∈
ZN . For any realization zm of Zm, the set Azm(θ) has exactly the same geometry than as described
above. Let P0(zm) be the true conditional choice probability vector. We obtain the following
characterization of the identified set (θ represents all α, β, γ for all firms i = 1, . . . , N):
θ ∈ ΘI ⇐⇒ ∀zm ∈ ZN , P0(zm) ∈ Azm(θ)
⇐⇒ ∀zm ∈ ZN , ∀q ∈ G, T∞(q, zm; θ) := δ∗(q;Azm(θ))− q>P0(zm) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ min
zm∈ZN
min
q∈G
T∞(q, zm; θ) ≥ 0
The only difference is to add minzm∈ZN to the procedure, i.e., augment the space over which we
take the minimum.
For the inference procedure, we first use a conditional frequency estimator to obtain the condi-
tional choice probabilities. For each y ∈ Y ,
PˆM(y|zm) =
∑M
m=1 1[Ym = y]1[Zm = zm]∑M
m=1 1[Zm = zm]
.
We define the stacked vector as PˆM(zm). This estimator is uniformly consistent, asymptotically
normal with a standard convergence speed.
The framework with conditioning variables is nearly the same as before. The only difference
comes from the fact that we have to minimize the quantity infq∈G T (q, zm; θ) over the discrete space.
The simulations of the critical values can be obtained equivalently.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a new methodology to estimate games with multiple equilibria. The model
may be set-identified, and belonging to this identified set is equivalent to testing whether the vector
of choice probabilities belongs to a convex set. We characterize the full geometric structure of this
convex set without adding any restriction on the selection mechanism in the regions with multiple
equilibria. This approach has two advantages. First, it allows us to characterize all the moment
inequalities that are necessarily satisfied for a parameter value to be in the identified set. Second,
as the complexity of the problem grows exponentially with the number of players, we are able to
propose an algorithm that geometrically selects the locally relevant moments, without having to
evaluate all of them. The algorithm sequentially approaches the nearest vertex of the polytope,
and it requires only the computation of the support function for a number of directions that is
polynomial in N , the number of players.
This is a huge improvement in computational burden with respect to alternative methods, which
need to numerically evaluate all the moments before deciding which ones are binding and which
ones are not. This geometric understanding can easily be extended to other notions of equilibrium
proposed in literature, e.g., two-level rationality and social interaction games. We also propose
inference methods that for small and moderate sample sizes have better statistical properties than
existing methods and offer a considerable advantage in terms of computational burden. Our methods
exploit the specific structure of the test statistic, the variance of which does not depend on the
parameter tested.
Many pending questions remain. First, entry games generally impose strong restrictions on
the functional form of the profit function and on the distribution of the error terms. Adapting
our procedure to more general settings (greater heterogeneity or semi-parametric forms) is high on
the research agenda. Second, it would be worth investigating inference on subvectors, a question,
that has recently been addressed in the partial identification literature, as in Kaido et al. (2018).
Finally, we have thus far been agnostic about the (unobserved) selection mechanism, and we have
used natural bounds. It would be worth investigating how restrictions on the selection mechanism
could be incorporated into this framework.
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Figures and Tables
A
q
δ∗(q;A)
δ∗(q;A) = sup
x∈A
q>x.
Figure 1: The support function
N K dK |S(K)| 2dK − dK − 1
3 1 3 4 4
2 3 4 4
4 1 4 11 11
2 6 21 59
3 4 11 11
5 1 5 26 26
2 10 71 1018
3 10 71 1018
4 5 26 26
6 1 6 57 57
2 15 198 32761
3 20 283 1048569
4 15 198 32761
5 6 57 57
Table I: Counting the number of multiple equilibria regions
36
B1(θ) B2(θ) B3(θ) B4(θ) B5(θ)
N = 4 4 10 4
N = 5 5 18 18 5
N = 6 6 52 136 52 6
Table II: Upper bound on the number of facets at any extreme point for N = 4, 5, 6.
Extreme point Interior point
True G L AS RSW True G L AS RSW
500 -2.555 -2.747 -2.562 -2.695 -2.771 -2.386 -2.747 -2.562 -2.715 -2.778
1000 -2.555 -2.747 -2.562 -2.655 -2.738 -2.386 -2.747 -2.562 -2.690 -2.774
2000 -2.555 -2.747 -2.562 -2.629 -2.697 -2.386 -2.747 -2.562 -2.630 -2.743
3000 -2.555 -2.747 -2.562 -2.617 -2.677 -2.386 -2.747 -2.562 -2.555 -2.705
10000 -2.555 -2.747 -2.562 -2.581 -2.634 -2.386 -2.747 -2.562 -2.394 -2.455
We compare the critical values of different procedures with the DGP of the set-identified model with 3
players, for two particular points tested. One point is an extreme point, i.e. 8 inequalities are binding in
this point. One is an ”interior” point, i.e. no inequality is binding but the ones related to the number of
players.
Table III: Critical values for different procedures.
Type Test Crit. α1 α1 α2 α2 α3 α3 β β Vol.
value min max min max min max min max CR
Bound G -0.657 -0.166 -0.715 -0.227 -0.684 -0.197 0.253 0.492 1.49
L -0.631 -0.184 -0.688 -0.243 -0.658 -0.214 0.263 0.479 1.06
Ineq1 G -0.714 -0.118 -0.755 -0.165 -0.743 -0.152 0.120 0.488 2.02
L -0.693 -0.134 -0.731 -0.180 -0.721 -0.167 0.132 0.478 1.59
Ineq2 G -0.655 -0.094 -0.713 -0.155 -0.683 -0.121 0.109 0.491 1.76
L -0.630 -0.114 -0.688 -0.175 -0.658 -0.141 0.126 0.478 1.29
Ineq3 G -0.721 -0.176 -0.762 -0.232 -0.750 -0.208 0.255 0.491 1.77
L -0.704 -0.185 -0.742 -0.241 -0.732 -0.217 0.258 0.483 1.45
Ineq4 G -0.655 -0.165 -0.716 -0.228 -0.682 -0.196 0.252 0.495 1.36
L -0.634 -0.179 -0.695 -0.240 -0.661 -0.209 0.258 0.483 1.05
Local L -0.634 -0.179 -0.695 -0.240 -0.661 -0.209 0.258 0.483 1.05
Exact -0.630 -0.181 -0.692 -0.242 -0.658 -0.212 0.259 0.481 1.00
Note: the test statistic is ξM (θ) calculated on a grid of points (α1, α2, α3, β): [−1.5; 0[ for the alpha’s with a tick
of 0.03 and [0; 1.2] for β with a tick of 0.02. The level is equal to 5%. We display the mean across one thousand
simulations of the minimum and maximum of each parameter. ”Vol. CR” is the mean volume of the confidence
regions normalized by the mean volume of the confidence regions computed with the local procedure with the exact
critical value. The true values are β = 0.35 and α1 = α2 = α3 = −0.4, the selection mechanism gives priority to firm
1 than to firm 2 to enter in the multiple equilibria regions; the econometrician does not assume that the α′s are the
same. The model is set-identified.
Table IV: The confidence region - 3 players, set-identified case, 1000 markets.
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Type Test Crit. α1 α1 α2 α2 α3 α3 β β Vol.
value min max min max min max min max CR
Bound G -1.146 -0.429 -0.973 -0.233 -1.150 -0.434 0.484 0.843 1.92
L -1.097 -0.446 -0.922 -0.250 -1.101 -0.450 0.492 0.809 1.36
Ineq1 G -1.156 -0.299 -0.986 -0.115 -1.160 -0.302 0.243 0.823 1.85
L -1.124 -0.315 -0.954 -0.130 -1.129 -0.318 0.257 0.803 1.49
Ineq2 G -1.137 -0.281 -0.955 -0.102 -1.141 -0.285 0.231 0.835 1.75
L -1.092 -0.301 -0.909 -0.122 -1.096 -0.305 0.252 0.803 1.30
Ineq3 G -1.172 -0.440 -1.002 -0.253 -1.175 -0.444 0.487 0.835 1.58
L -1.143 -0.449 -0.973 -0.261 -1.147 -0.453 0.489 0.816 1.31
Ineq4 G -1.133 -0.431 -0.943 -0.238 -1.137 -0.435 0.483 0.838 1.33
L -1.099 -0.443 -0.908 -0.252 -1.102 -0.448 0.489 0.816 1.04
Local L -1.099 -0.443 -0.908 -0.252 -1.102 -0.448 0.489 0.816 1.04
Exact -1.093 -0.446 -0.904 -0.254 -1.097 -0.451 0.491 0.814 1.00
Note: the test statistic is ξM (θ) calculated on a grid of points (α1, α2, α3, β): [−1.5; 0[ for the alpha’s with a tick
of 0.03 and [0; 1.2] for β with a tick of 0.02. The level is equal to 5%. We display the mean across one thousand
simulations of the minimum and maximum of each parameter. ”Vol. CR” is the mean volume of the confidence
regions normalized by the mean volume of the confidence regions computed with the local procedure. The true values
are β = 0.6, α2 = −0.5 and α1 = α3 = −0.7 the selection mechanism gives priority to firm 1 than to firm 2 to enter
in the multiple equilibria regions; the econometrician does not assume that α1 and α3 are the same. The model is
set-identified.
Table V: The confidence region - 3 players, set-identified case, 1000 markets.
Test Crit. α1 α1 α2 α2 β β Vol.
value min max min max min max CR
Bound G -0.602 -0.232 -0.455 -0.062 0.253 0.682 2.60
L -0.576 -0.240 -0.430 -0.072 0.260 0.648 2.04
Ineq1 G -0.573 -0.242 -0.421 -0.095 0.176 0.631 2.21
L -0.542 -0.254 -0.394 -0.106 0.197 0.593 1.55
Ineq3 G -0.575 -0.247 -0.423 -0.097 0.259 0.633 1.80
L -0.547 -0.258 -0.399 -0.108 0.271 0.600 1.30
Ineq4 G -0.561 -0.243 -0.417 -0.083 0.250 0.645 1.55
L -0.525 -0.259 -0.381 -0.101 0.267 0.598 1.00
Local L -0.526 -0.258 -0.381 -0.100 0.267 0.598 1.00
Note: the test statistic is ξM (θ) calculated on a grid of points (α1, α2, β): [−1.5; 0[ for the alpha’s and [0; 1.2] for β
with a tick of 0.01. The level is equal to 5%. We display the mean across one thousand simulations of the minimum
and maximum of each parameter. ”Vol. CR” is the mean volume of the confidence regions normalized by the mean
volume of the confidence regions computed with the local procedure. The true values are β = 0.38, α1 = α4 = −0.35
and α2 = α3 = −0.2, the order of entry of the firms in the multiple equilibria regions is random. The model is
point-identified.
Table VI: The confidence region - 4 players, point-identified case, 1000 markets.
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